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Abstract  
This article analyses tensions of governance within the core-executive of the 
European Union – the Commission. The applied test-bed is seconded national civil 
servants (SNEs) hired on short-term contracts in the Commission. The analysis 
benefits from a rich body of surveys and interview data among current and former 
SNEs. The data demonstrate that the decision-making behaviour evoked by SNEs 
contains a mix of departmental, epistemic and supranational behaviour. 
Intergovernmental dynamics are shown to be much less significant. The study also 
demonstrates that the secondment system scarcely creates enduring supranational 
loyalties among SNEs. The socialising powers of the Commission is conditional and 
only partly sustained when SNEs exit the Commission. The temporal identity of SNEs 
as an ‘EU civil servant’ is dependent on their primary institutional embeddedness 
within the Commission. Theoretically, tensions of governance in the Commission are 
accounted for by an institutionalist approach. 
 
Introduction
1
 
Executive governance in Europe faces enduring and enhanced tensions between 
competing interests, concerns, norms and values (Olsen 2007). Profound 
transformation of executive governance partly has to do with the increasing multilevel 
integration of public administration in Europe whereby “previously separate units 
[turn] into components of a coherent system” of executive government (Deutsch 
1968: 158). Increasing interaction and interdependence between the European 
Commission (Commission) and domestic administration creates tensions of executive 
governance at both levels (Egeberg 2006; March and Olsen 2006). Moreover, 
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different executive institutions are making increasingly complex trade-offs in order to 
solve, buffer and rebalance these tensions (Kettl 2002: 153). This article analyses 
tensions of governance within the core-executive of the European Union (EU) – the 
Commission.  
 
This study has three ambitions: First, a conceptual map is outlined that suggests four 
generic dynamics that compete for attention in every-day Commission governance. 
Arguably, tensions of governance within the Commission oscillate between 
supranational, intergovernmental, departmental and epistemic dynamics. This four-
fold conceptual map is subsequently transposed into a corresponding conceptual map 
of the decision-making behaviour, roles and loyalties available to individual 
Commission officials (see Table 1 beneath). Secondly, this study outlines an 
institutional approach to account for conditions under which each of these dynamics 
are applied by Commission officials. Finally, the article offers an empirical analysis 
illuminating tensions of governance at the actor-level among temporary Commission 
officials. This analysis benefits from a rich body of three separate but tightly co-
ordinated surveys (N = 162) and interview studies (N = 50) among current and former 
temporary Commission officials (see beneath). 
  
The Commission occupies a pivotal role as the core-executive EU institution with key 
initiating powers, resources and capacities. Yet, beyond single-case studies there is a 
surprising dearth of theoretically informed empirical studies of the Commission 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Gehring 2003; Gould and Kelman 1970; Johnston 
2005; Rochester 1989). This study theorises and empirically illuminates tensions of 
governance in the Commission. Arguably, a crucial test thereof is the extent to which 
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the Commission manages to weaken intergovernmental behavioural dynamics among 
individual officials and induce them to supranational, departmental and epistemic 
behaviour. One under-researched test-bed thereof is seconded national civil servants 
hired on short-term contracts in the Commission (SNEs in Commission phraseology) 
(Trondal 2004).  
 
The High Autority of 1952 was largely staffed by SNEs from the member-state 
governments, and the intention of its first President (Jean Monnet) was that the High 
Authority should rely on a seconded, flexible staff of top experts (Duchêne 1994: 
240). However, SNEs have never dominated the Commission staff, but their number 
has steadily increased in the 1990s, particularly under the Delors Commission, to 
1132 SNEs (10 percent) of the present Commission (Statistical Bulletin of 
Commission Staff 01/2007). From the outset, SNEs have a double allegiance since 
they are employees of their home organisation (financially and officially), but they 
work under the instructions of the Commission. SNEs are obliged to behave solely in 
the interests of the Commission and not to accept any instructions or duties from their 
home government. Moreover, they do not have the authority to represent the 
Commission externally or to enter into any commitments on behalf of the 
Commission.
2
 This double role is further exacerbated by the fact that the whole 
secondment system is based on the assumption that SNEs return to their home 
organisation after the termination of their secondment contract (Trondal 2004).  
 
The dependent variable of this study is the actual decision-making behaviour and 
loyalties evoked by SNEs. Arguably, SNEs are rifted between four behavioural logics 
– intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and epistemic logics (see Table 1 
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below). Whereas intergovernmental behaviour upholds territorial preferences, 
concerns, roles and loyalties, the latter three dynamics severely weaken the extent to 
which SNEs represent their home government. Whereas supranational behaviour 
denotes that SNEs have a strong “cosmopolitan” Commission loyalty and act on 
mandates issued by the Commission’s politico-administrative leadership, 
departmental and epistemic behaviour is more or less decoupled from politico-
administrative control from the home government and the Commission. Departmental 
behaviour is guided by administrative rules and procedures codified in the portfolios 
assigned to SNEs. Epistemic behaviour is guided by professional expertise and the 
educational background of the SNEs, loosely knit to fixed mandates from the 
Commission and the member-state leadership.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
An institutional approach is outlined suggesting conditions under which each of the 
above dynamics is applied by SNEs. It is argued that decision-making dynamics may 
be accounted for by considering (i) the procedures used to recruit SNEs to the 
Commission, (ii) the organisational affiliations of SNEs, (iii) the formal embeddeness 
of SNEs inside the Commission, and (iv) finally processes of socialisation of SNEs 
within the Commission. Arguably, tensions of governance among SNEs are 
conditioned by these variables.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. The next section outlines an institutional approach 
from which four independent variables is derived. The next section presents the 
methodology and the survey and interview data underpinning this study. The 
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following section presents the main findings on Commission SNEs. This presentation 
systematically compares current and former SNEs. The data demonstrate that the 
decision-making behaviour evoked by SNEs contain a mix of departmental, epistemic 
and supranational behaviour. The intergovernmental dynamic is shown to be much 
less significant. Essentially, when comparing current and former SNEs, loyalties 
towards particular EU institutions do vary considerably among these officials. The 
study, however, demonstrates that overall system loyalties towards the EU as a whole 
seem to be rather sticky and remain strong also among former SNEs. However, the 
socialising powers of the Commission is conditional and only partially sustained 
when SNEs exit the Commission. The “temporal identity” of SNEs as an ‘EU civil 
servant’ is dependent on their primary institutional embeddedness within the 
Commission (Gravier 2007: 24). The secondment system thus does not create 
enduring supranational loyalties across levels of government in Europe. This study 
also shows that the actual contact patterns applied by SNEs do not support the 
development of a multilevel EU administration by the remarkably low degree of 
national contacts during the secondment period. These observations underscore the de 
facto autonomy of SNEs vis-à-vis the member-states while working at the 
Commission, acting largely as “isolated nomads” (Gravier 2007: 19). 
 
An Institutional Approach 
Students of international executive institutions (IEIs) tend to adopt neo-liberalist and 
realist approaches and apply principal-agent theory to understand the baseline 
dynamics of IEIs (Hasenclever et al. 1996). Basically, rationalist accounts focus on 
patterns of co-operation and conflict among states and see IEIs as vehicles for 
maximising state preferences and for lowering transaction costs. Recent studies of 
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IEIs have made a combined ‘institutionalist and constructivist turn’ and re-discovered 
questions of actor socialisation, complex learning and cognitive framing of norms and 
rules (Checkel 2005; Trondal et al. 2005). IEIs are pictured as more than empty 
vessels and neutral arenas in which state representatives gather. An equivalent 
rediscovery of institutions was made in the field of organisation theory over twenty 
years ago (March and Olsen 1984). The independent variables outlined beneath 
benefit from this organisational and institutional school of thought. One additional 
criterion for selecting the independent variables is how successfully they have 
survived past empirical tests. 
 
Most scholars treat institutionalist and social constructivist approaches separately (e.g. 
Wiener and Diez 2004). However, the institutionalist – social constructivist divide is 
narrower than often assumed (Trondal 2001). Both sociological institutionalism and 
middle-range social constructivist accounts emphasise some common independent 
variables (notably the re-socialisation of actors) as well as fairly similar dependent 
variables (identity and role change among individual actors). However, whereas 
middle-range social constructivist scholarship tend to under-theorise the 
organisational context within which social interaction occurs, institutional and 
organisation theory approaches tend to neglect aspects of social interaction (e.g. 
Checkel 2005; Egeberg 2006; March and Olsen 2006). By applying so-called 
“both/and” theorising, the institutional approach suggested here combines micro-
mechanisms from institutional and social constructivist scholarship. 
 
Civil servants live with a constant overload of inconsistent concerns that call for 
attention at particular decision situations. Under these conditions, formal and informal 
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institutions guide the decision-making behaviour of civil servants due to the 
computational limitations among the latter (Simon 1997) and as a response to 
internalised rules and practices embedded in formal rules (March and Olsen 2006). 
Formal organisations “are collections of structures, rules and standard operating 
procedures that have a partly autonomous role in political life” (March and Olsen 
2006: 4). Accordingly, to Schattschneider (1975: 30) “organization is itself a 
mobilization of bias in preparation for action”. Institutions are systematic devices for 
simplifying, classifying, routinising, directing and sequencing information towards 
particular decision situations (Schattschneider 1975: 58). Causal mechanisms that 
connect institutions and actor behaviour are logics of appropriateness, deliberative 
rationalism, incentive systems and bounded rationality (Rhodes et al. 2006). For 
example, the limited cognitive capacities of civil servants are systematised by the 
specialisation of formal organisations into units and divisions. By specialising formal 
organisations each civil servant is assigned a portfolio of problems, solutions and 
consequences s/he directs systematic attention to (Egeberg 2006). Organisational 
specialisation leads to local rationalities and local and routinised learning cycles 
among the incumbents (Olsen 2006). The logic of appropriateness also guides 
officials to decision-making behaviour deemed appropriate by internalised 
perceptions of proper conduct (March and Olsen 2006). Moreover, actors often are 
embedded within multiple organisations, so that each actor receives multiple and 
often ambiguous cues for action. The independent variables derived from this 
institutional approach are the following: (i) recruitment procedures, (ii) organisational 
affiliations, (iii) the formal organisational composition of institutions, and (iv) 
processes of socialisation within institutions. 
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Recruitment procedures in the Commission 
The decision-making behaviour of government officials may be greatly affected by 
the procedures applied to recruit staff. Different procedures for recruitment tend to 
bring in different people and keep them more or less autonomous vis-à-vis past 
constituencies (Cox 1969). Basically, recruitment may be based on a merit principle, 
as in most Western democracies, or on a quota principle or other systems of patronage 
or parachutage, as in the top echelon of the American civil service (Ingraham 1995: 
9). Whereas the merit principle recruits permanent civil servants on the basis of 
competence and past achievements, the quota principle typically recruits officials on 
more temporary contracts on the basis of, for example, professional, sectoral or 
territorial mandates (Ingraham 1995: xix). SNEs are not recruited to the Commission 
through the open competition process to vacancies based on a written test, but in a 
more opaque process described by Stevens and Stevens (2001: 87) as a “submarine 
approach” or as an entry to the Commission services through the back door. In the 
Commission, initiatives to launch vacancies and the final selection of relevant 
candidates to SNE contracts are co-ordinated by the Director or Head of Unit in the 
relevant Commission DG (EEA 2002: 4). SNE vacancies are usually made public by 
informing the Permanent Representations of member-states in Brussels, which 
subsequently contact the respective national authorities. The recruiting Commission 
unit receives the applications of SNE candidates from the member-states, makes a 
shortlist and selects SNEs, usually as a result of an interview. Moreover, it is the 
Commission that determines the job description for each SNE (administered by DG 
ADMIN), based on initial information from the member-states about particular 
preferences among particular SNEs. The vast majority of SNEs seem to be recruited 
on the initiative of individual Commission DGs as well as on the basis of personal 
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initiatives by individual SNEs (Statskontoret 2001:17: 34). Arguably, because the 
“submarine” procedure for recruitment of SNEs is not a responsibility of the central 
staffing service but is heavily governed by the separate DGs instead, it is conducive to 
departmental behaviour among the SNEs.  
 
Organisational affiliations  
The second independent variable considered is the characteristics of the relationships 
that may develop between organisations. This study stresses the fact that the 
Commission serves as part of complex webs of organisations, notably networks with 
member-state bureaucracies. Commission SNEs typically have multiple institutional 
affiliations - both nationally and internationally – that pose multiple cognitive frames, 
incentives and norms of appropriate conduct. The bounded rationality of humans 
reduces their capacity to attend to more than one organisation at a time (Simon 1997: 
288). The logic of primacy implies that primary institutional affiliations of civil 
servants affect their behavioural patterns more extensively than secondary affiliations 
(Egeberg 2006). Hence, there is a hierarchy of organisational memberships present 
(Flora 1999: 35). The demands that these affiliations pose may conflict, thereby 
inducing role and behavioural conflicts among the officials. Arguably, primary 
institutions create salient behaviour and roles whereas secondary institutions create 
less salient repertoires of behaviour for actors (Ashford and Mael 2004: 141). The 
SNE contracts prescribe that SNEs have their primary institutional affiliation inside 
the Commission. They are expected to transfer their organisational affiliation from the 
domestic government to the Commission for a short time period. Assuming that the 
behaviour of SNEs do conform to this prescription, they are likely to be more 
supranationally than intergovernmentally oriented while seconded to the Commission. 
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However, former SNEs who have returned to their home government transfer their 
primary organisational affiliations to their member-state administration, and are 
subsequently likely to become more intergovernmentally oriented. Hence, the 
supranational orientation is not likely to be sustained when SNEs leave the 
Commission after the contract expires.  
 
The organisational composition of the Commission  
Political orders are hybrids and inconsistent collections “of institutions that fit more or 
less into a coherent system” (Ansell 2004: 234). Political orders consist of formal 
organisations that are partial systems incorporated into larger systems. Formal 
organisations tend to accumulate conflicting organisational principles through 
horizontal and vertical specialisation. Conflicting organisational codes tend to give 
conflicting cues for appropriate conduct (Barnard 1968: 278). When specialising 
formal organisations horizontally, two conventional principles have been suggested 
by Luther Gulick (1937). First, formal organisations may be specialised by the major 
purpose served – like research, health, food safety, etc. This principle of organisation 
tends to activate patterns of co-operation and conflicts among incumbents along 
sectoral (departmental) cleavages (Egeberg 2006). Behavioural patterns and loyalties 
tend to be channelled within departmental portfolios rather than across them. 
Arguably, organisation by major purpose served is likely to bias decision-making 
dynamics towards a departmental logic where preferences, contact patterns, roles and 
loyalties are directed towards portfolios, DGs and units. Organisations specialised by 
purpose also tend to create organisational loyalties towards units and divisions rather 
than towards the whole organisation at large. The Commission DG and unit structure 
is a prominent example of this horizontal principle of specialisation. The Commission 
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is a horizontally pillarised system of government specialised by purpose and with 
fairly weak organisational capabilities for horizontal co-ordination at the top through 
Presidential command (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2005).
3
  
 
A second principle of horizontal specialisation present within the Commission is the 
principle of the major process utilised – like administration, legal service, personnel 
services, etc. (Gulick 1937). This principle of organisation, however, is secondary to 
the principle of purpose outlined above. The process principle encourages the 
horizontal integration of functional departments and the disintegration of the major 
purposes served. Within the Commission the internal services like Legal Service and 
DG for Translation illustrates the process principle. Arguably, organisation by major 
process is conducive to departmental and epistemic behaviour among the incumbents.  
 
The Commission also embodies a territorial principle of organisation as well as a 
party political component. Territorial concerns are embedded into the Commission 
services by the recruitment of de facto national officials (which is particularly evident 
in the case of SNEs), notably among Administrators, Cabinets and Commissioners. 
Secondly, a party political component is organised into the College, particularly 
because Commissioners have become increasingly political heavyweights and 
because of the creeping parliamentarisation of the College (MacMullen 1997; Nugent 
2006). In sum, the Commission is a ‘multi-organisation’ horizontally specialised 
according to two main principles of organisation (Christiansen 1997), contributing to 
“sending ambivalent signals to Commission officials” (Hooghe 1997: 105). During 
the contract period, the Commission serves as the primary organisational affiliation of 
SNEs, rendering them particularly sensitive to the multiple organisational signals and 
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selections provided by the Commission organisation. Hence, the horizontal 
specialisation of the Commission administration by purpose and process is conducive 
the enactment of departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics among SNEs.  
 
Processes of socialisation within the Commission 
A vast literature has revealed that the impact of pre-socialisation on actors’ roles and 
identities is modified by organisational re-socialisation (e.g. Checkel 2005). National 
officials entering the Commission are subject to an organisational “exposure effect” 
upon arrival (Johnston 2005: 1039) that may contribute to re-socialisation. 
Socialisation is a dynamic process whereby individuals are induced into the norms 
and rules of a given community. Departing from this simplistic assumption, our 
argument is that, when “members of one polity serve as participants in the political 
processes of another” (Rosenau 1969: 46), as when domestic officials work as SNEs 
in the Commission, the length and intensity of participation in the Commission may 
affect the extent to which supranational role perceptions are evoked among the 
officials. Apart from being formal members of Commission, protracted and intensive 
interaction and participation within this institution is conducive to the evocation of 
supranational role perceptions amongst the officials. Parallel to this argument, Haas 
(1958) assumed that participants become ‘locked in’ and socialised by the sheer 
intensity of interaction. Chief to the neo-functionalist approach, the potential for re-
socialisation to occur (‘shift of loyalty towards a new centre’) is assumed positively 
related to the duration and the intensity of interaction among actors (Haas 1958: 16). 
This claim rests on socialisation theory that emphasises a positive relationship 
between the intensity of participation within a collective group and the extent to 
which members of this group develop perceptions of group belongingness and an 
 15 
esprit de corps. Protracted and intensive actor-interaction is conducive to 
internalisation of the norms and rules of the community (Checkel 2005). Hence, the 
socialising experience within the Commission is to some extent likely to increase 
SNEs loyalties towards the EU system. Re-socialised SNEs who do re-enter their 
home organisation after their SNE contract expires are likely to retain some 
supranational loyalty towards the EU system. However, re-socialisation within the 
Commission arguably makes it more difficult for former SNEs to smoothly re-enter 
their home organisations afterwards (as they are formally expected), thus increasing 
the likelihood that former SNEs will not continue their careers within a home 
government, but elsewhere, for instance in another international organisation or in the 
private sector.   
 
Data and methods 
Empirical research on SNEs is rare. This study benefits from three separate but highly 
co-ordinated studies of SNEs. The first study consists mainly of Swedish, Danish and 
Norwegian SNEs (Trondal 2006). Based on similar methodology, this first study was 
replicated twice on SNEs from the Netherlands. In sum, these data includes three 
surveys (N=162) and three in-depth qualitative interview studies (N=50) on SNEs. 
The mean response rate in the surveys is 73 per cent.  
 
There exists no available, updated or complete list of Commission SNEs. The 
observations reported below are thus based on survey and interview data among three 
selected samples. The first sample resulted from a short-list of 125 SNEs provided by 
CLENAD
4
 and the EFTA Secretariat. The reason for using the EFTA Secretariat is 
that it provides updated online lists of SNEs from the EEA countries Norway, Iceland 
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and Lichtenstein. The survey data on the Nordic SNEs were collected through a postal 
inquiry in 2004. After three rounds of reminders the final sample totals 72, giving a 
response rate of 58 percent. This response rate is low compared to surveys in domestic 
central administrations, but higher than recent studies of the Commission (e.g. 
Hooghe 2005). This first sample covers SNEs from 15 Commission DGs
5
, two EU 
member-countries and two EEA countries.
6
 This sample is strongly biased towards 
the Nordic countries. This survey is supplemented by in-depth interviews among a 
sub-sample of Swedish and Norwegian SNEs. 22 interviews were conducted in the 
winter 2004 - 2005 on the basis of a semi-structured interview-guide.  
 
The second and third survey samples are composed of 90 Dutch SNEs divided into 
two groups: one group of officials who are currently working as SNE at the 
Commission, and one group of former SNEs who were seconded between 2001 and 
2005.
7
 Survey and interview data were collected for both groups of respondents. The 
survey and interview questions have been adapted from the first SNE study, thereby 
sharing similar methodological platform. The whole population of current Dutch 
SNEs received a questionnaire (62 in total)
8
, out of which 46 responded, resulting in a 
74 percent response rate. This makes our data on current Dutch SNEs highly 
representative and reliable. Supplementary interviews were conducted with eight of 
these officials. 
 
Due to the absence of complete records, the group of former SNEs were reached using 
the snowballing method. Out of a total population of 91 former SNEs, we were able to 
contact 51 of these SNEs filled in the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 86 
percent. Snowballing does not pose problems for interpreting the results, since we 
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only report frequencies in the analysis. Moreover, 20 interviews were conducted with 
this group of respondents. The next section is illustrated with direct quotations from 
the transcribed interviews.  
 
In the following empirical analysis, survey data on current Nordic SNEs is labelled 
‘Data 1’, the survey data on current Dutch SNEs is labelled ‘Data 2’, and finally, the 
survey data on former Dutch SNEs is labelled ‘Data 3’. 
 
The item non-response rate was fairly low for the surveys in total, the poorest item-
score equalling 58 respondents. The survey questions have been streamlined to enable 
comparison between the three data sets. The former SNEs have been asked questions 
regarding their secondment period and their current functions to enable cross-time 
comparisons. The cross-time comparisons should be read with caution; however, 
since the responses to survey questions with regard to the secondment period of 
former SNEs rely on their memory. An inevitable problem connected to research that 
relies on respondents’ memories are the potential deficiency on the part of the 
accuracy of the respondents’ input. Another caveat is the danger that respondents may 
portray themselves in a most favourable way. One potential implication thereof is that 
the role of SNEs as member-state representatives may be under-reported in the data. 
Moreover, supranational behavioural dynamics among SNEs may also partly reflect a 
self-selection effect. According to Edward Page (1997: 60), SNEs generally have 
contacts with the Commission prior to entering it. Frequently, they “indicate a wish to 
spend three years in Brussels” (Page 1997: 60). This indicates that a supranational 
role may reflect processes of pre-socialisation outside as well as re-socialisation inside 
the Commission. 
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Tensions of governance in the Commission 
A considerable part of the output crafted by the Commission is initiated, drafted and 
put on the agenda at the administrative level. Hence, to understand Commission 
governance one has to unpack the behavioural dynamics among Commission 
Administrators, including SNEs. Of the Commission workforce of 11 263 full-time 
policy-making Administrators, 1132 officials (10 percent) are seconded on temporary 
posts (Statistical Bulletin on Commission Staff 01/2007). Outside the Commission, 
government officials at the member-state level are also increasingly hired on 
temporary posts, rendering their perceived organisational memberships vague, 
unstable and ambiguous (Bartel and Dutton 2001: 116; Hall 2002). Temporary 
officials provide the Commission with additional expertise, supply learning across 
levels of government, secure the Commission with a more flexible workforce hired 
through a fast-track recruitment system (the “submarine procedure”), and offer 
national officials with added EU experiences. According to one current Dutch SNE,  
“SNEs bring an external perspective to the Commission, a new zest. [The 
Commission] no longer thinks that the concours is the only right way of 
recruiting people or that candidates who passed the concours are better than 
civil servants from the member states. [The Commission] can continue to build 
bridges to the member states. At the end of the day, both sides profit because it 
[the SNE system] brings in fresh knowledge. It is a link that provides much 
better insights. [The Commission] draws in people with a very different 
experience” (Interview). 
 
SNEs make decisions within the Commission almost on the same footing as 
permanent Commission Administrators. They are recruited to the Commission on 
short term contracts (maximum four years), paid by their home government, and the 
majority foresee a return to past positions in domestic ministries or agencies when 
 19 
their temporary contracts come to an end (CLENAD 2003). Moreover, while working 
for the Commission, SNEs are presumed to transfer their primary organisational 
affiliation from the member-state administration to the Commission. Although SNEs 
are typically seconded from the administrations (national, regional, or local) of EU 
member-states, the Commission also recruits experts from non-member states (e.g. 
Norway), private sector and from other international organisations.  
 
The Netherlands, at least until recently, was thought to be underrepresented within the 
Commission bureaucracy, partially stemming from the fact that the concours was 
difficult to pass for Dutch candidates due to a mismatch between the concours 
examination system and the Dutch educational system. This led the Dutch 
government to take active measures aimed at increasing the number of Dutch 
officials, namely by introducing training courses for the concours and appointing an 
official to the Dutch EU Permanent Representation responsible for coordinating 
Dutch appointments to EU institutions.
10
 
 
Secondments meanwhile have been a safe way to secure posts for Dutch incumbents. 
The Netherlands is currently the home country of 62 SNEs to the Commission, which 
makes up for the 5.5 percent of the total SNE population of 1132 (Statistical Bulletin 
of Commission Staff 01/2007). The EFTA countries currently have 38 SNEs in the 
Commission, which make up for 3.4 percent of the SNE population 
(http://secretariat.efta.int). These figures are not exclusively reflecting government 
strategies but also to the fact that the member-states (and non-member-states) have 
high levels of expertise sought for by the Commission.
11
 Furthermore, the proximity 
of the Netherlands to Belgium makes it easier to keep one foot in the home country 
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during the secondment, a factor which can play a role in terms of the personal lives of 
potential SNEs.
12
 The Netherlands has therefore a relative advantage compared to 
other member-states in terms of the potential benefits from the secondment system.   
 
Table 2 reveals the distribution of contact patterns evoked by current and former 
Commission SNEs. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 clearly reveals two main patterns: First, departmental contact patterns are by 
far the most frequent contact pattern among both current and former SNEs. This 
observation may be explained by the horizontal specialisation of the Commission 
services (with respect to current SNEs) as well as domestic administrations (with 
respect to former SNEs). Inside the Commission hierarchy the Heads of Unit are 
pictured as central gate-keepers (Interviews). “The thing most SNEs comment on is 
how important the hierarchy in the Commission is.” (CLENAD 2003: 43) According 
to one current Dutch SNE, “the room for manoeuvre of an SNE depends on the DG 
and the Head of Unit” (Interview). According to one current Swedish SNE, “I have 
had four Heads of Unit, and the working procedures have changed each time” 
(Interview). These observations reflect that departmental contact patterns among 
SNEs reflect the Commission structure.  
 
Moreover, table 2 demonstrates that the organisational affiliation towards the 
Commission “matter” with respect to the distribution of intergovernmental and 
supranational contacts. Former Dutch SNEs have by far more intergovernmental 
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contacts than current SNEs. We also see that current SNEs have much stronger 
supranational contact patterns than former SNEs. These observations clearly show 
that the Commission is a primary organisational affiliation to SNEs.  
Many former SNEs report in interviews that the drop in supranational contacts after 
return is dramatic and that this is an important “missed opportunity” for their home 
organisations. However, some former SNEs seem to maintain contacts towards the 
Commission. According to one former Dutch SNE, “I do still have a lot of contacts 
from the period of my secondment. And I do use these contacts, but that is mainly 
through informal channels. I have reasonably often contacts with my former 
[Commission] colleagues from other member states.” (Interview). Current Dutch 
SNEs report that permanent staff of the Commission often does not have elaborate 
contacts with member states, and hence that the SNEs fulfil a specific role in 
providing access to those networks.  
 
A majority of current SNEs even report a wish of continuing working in an EU 
institution after their secondment contract expired (CLENAD 2003: 7). However, the 
vast majority do return to their home organisation after their short Commission career. 
Most returned SNEs report a weakening of their supranational contacts established 
during their secondment period. Many are also disappointed that they are granted little 
relevant portfolios upon return in their home organisations. According to a study by 
the staff organisation for SNEs (CLENAD 2003: 26), “[i]t appears that SNEs often 
return to vacant posts which have limited relevance to the knowledge and skills 
gained on secondment”. According to one former Dutch SNE, 
“For my current position it is absolutely not required to have experience 
within the Commission. The only thing I presently do that is related to Europe, 
is the implementation of a directive, but I could just as well have done that 
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without having been seconded. Similarly, I am not involved in the negotiations 
that take place on the part of my home ministry in Brussels” (Interview).  
 
Another former Dutch SNE reports that,  
 
“There is zero connection between the experience I gained in Brussels and the 
position I currently fulfil. I ended up at a position in which I have absolutely 
nothing to do with European dossiers. I find it downright shocking how the 
Dutch government deals with ex-SNEs. There is absolutely no interest for their 
capabilities and the added value of their secondment is not used to the benefit 
of the organisation. You spent three years building up a network, and it is just 
wasted.” (Interview).  
 
A third former Dutch SNE informs us that,  
 
“I have to say that I am very disappointed about the fact that when I returned I 
did not get a position in which I could work with European dossiers. So I 
cannot apply the experience I gained in Brussels. The contacts that I had with 
my Dutch unit during the secondment always took place on my initiative; it 
really was a one-way traffic. No-one made use of the fact that I was there at 
the Commission, neither during the secondment, neither afterwards” 
(Interview).  
 
Also, many of the former SNEs mentioned that in spite of the fact that their current 
position often had little relation to their work at the Commission, they did still 
maintain their network, if only for social purposes (Interviews). Many former SNEs 
report that these contacts give them an information advantage vis-à-vis their 
colleagues and superiors. They argue that they personally still benefit from the 
secondment, but that their home administration does not profit substantially from their 
secondment (Interviews).  
 
Intergovernmental contacts are few and mainly directed towards the governments of 
other countries rather than towards the government of their country of origin (Trondal 
2006). Many returned SNEs report that while they were seconded, their home 
organisation did not seek contact with them. Most contacts between the SNEs and the 
home administration was a result of the initiatives of the SNEs, partly to allow the 
organisation to benefit from the experience they were gaining, partly in order not to be 
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forgotten and thus hoping to boost their career opportunities upon return (Interviews). 
Most SNEs report that their home ministry or agency seldom initiates contacts 
(Interview). According to one current Norwegian SNE, “I have very little contact with 
my ministry back home, almost nothing” (Interview). “I only get information [from 
my home administration] if I ask for it” (CLENAD 2003: 21). According to one 
former Dutch SNE, 
“During my secondment I had quite some contact with my colleagues at home 
at my own initiative. I also sent out a newsletter to my own unit and to my own 
department, to keep people in The Hague up to date with what I was doing in 
Brussels. I also went regularly to return-home days in The Hague. 
Nonetheless, at the senior/management level there was little attention for what 
I was doing in Brussels” (Interview).  
Another former Dutch SNE reports that,  
 
“At one point I knew my boss was going to visit someone at the DG that I was 
working at. Nonetheless, it did not occur to him to stop by at my room and to 
enquire what I was doing there and how I was performing” (Interview).  
 
The following phrase seems to cover the impression of most SNEs: “Out of sight, out 
of mind” (CLENAD 2003: 26; Statskontoret 2001:17: 11). SNEs receive “very little 
feedback from capitals … and … in general they had expected to be in closer contact 
with their employer” (EFTA Secretariat, 2000, 2). Some SNEs report a preference for 
more intensive contacts with their member-state ministries than offered by these 
ministries (Interviews). These observations reflect the primacy of the Commission for 
SNEs and the de facto autonomy of SNEs vis-à-vis their home governments. One 
reason for this lack of contact initiated by the home administration may be the lack of 
domestic strategy on SNEs. For example, the Swedish Government admit lacking a 
central strategy on SNEs and that they have a rather poor central co-ordination of how 
Swedish SNEs should be recruitment and utilised by the Swedish Government 
(Statskontoret 2001:17: 9; The Government Offices of Sweden 2002: 14).
13
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Next, Table 3 applies a “reputational approach” to assess governance dynamics in the 
Commission (Jacobsen 2007). The Table demonstrates the extent to which SNEs are 
perceived to act like independent experts and/or like member-state representatives. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 clearly confirms that most SNEs perceive themselves as acting like 
independent experts while working in the Commission. The variations in the Table are 
marginal. However, some member-state representation also seems to occur among 
SNEs, particularly among Nordic SNEs (Data 1). In both ‘Data 2’ and ‘Data 3’ the 
overwhelming majority of respondents view themselves as independent experts and 
only a minority see themselves as member-state representatives. According to one 
former Dutch SNE, 
“[a]s SNE one should be neutral, so you cannot privilege your own member 
state. Some SNEs do trespass this boundary. I knew a Dutch SNE who did that 
and I addressed him about it. He admitted the things I said. Sometimes 
documents from my department in The Netherlands arrived at my desk and I 
had to assess them. I always took a critical look at such documents because I 
knew it would increase their chances for success. However, my colleagues at 
home were by no means appreciative of my critical attitude. But I actually did 
them a favour, because some documents that they submitted were just not in 
order and without my interference they would not even have been taken into 
consideration by the Commission. I really saved my department at home from 
making big blunders” (Interview).  
 
Another former Dutch SNE reports that,  
 
“I was an independent expert, but I was also used by my Head of Department 
at the Commission to leak information to my Dutch organisation” (Interview). 
 
One explanation for the enactment of a member-state role among SNEs may be due to 
an increased guidance and level of instructions from their home government. Over the 
years, Dutch SNEs have increasingly been exposed to domestic guidance and 
instruction. Moreover, it appears that views regarding the appropriateness of national 
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interest representation also play a role in this respect. These views are at least partially 
shaped during SNEs pre-socialisation within their national administrative culture. As 
a former Commissionner noted: “To be fair, one must start by accepting that we all 
bring with ourselves a baggage of preconceived ideas outlooks and prejudices, many 
of them of a specific national nature.” (Quoted in Page 1997: 115)   
 
Testimony of the cross-national variation on these views is given by the fact that 
several Dutch SNEs claim that France makes significantly more strategic use of their 
SNEs. Some Scandinavian SNEs also report that French SNEs tend to have a stronger 
intergovernmental role than other SNEs: “France uses the French SNEs to the 
maximum. They are consulted directly by the French Government” (Interview). 
Similarly, a study by the Swedish government agency Statskontoret (2001:17) 
indicates that the British government uses their SNEs instrumentally to influence the 
Commission. In stark contrast to the non-existing Swedish SNE policy (see above), 
the British SNE policy is both explicitly stated and highly co-ordinated by the Cabinet 
Office (Statskontoret 2001:17: 51). These observations clearly reflect the impact of 
the nationally determined cultural aspects of administrative systems and the degree to 
which national governments have developed a policy regarding the coordination of 
SNE activities. However, according to one former Dutch SNE,  
“the Netherlands is a member state that does not make much use of these 
possibilities. In the Netherlands lobbying is frowned upon. This is in great 
contrast with the French who very effectively make use of their nationals 
within the Commission. … [T]he French, but also the Irish have a good grip 
on their fonctionnaires within the Commission, and thus are those states 
ensured that their interests within the EU are permanently being served at a 
variety of different levels. The Netherlands appears to have ethical objections 
against such a strategy. In my case civil servants of my home department were 
told to avoid me if they were in Brussels, because otherwise there would be a 
danger that I would pass on classified information from within the 
Commission. For ethical reasons people in The Hague choose to remain 
ignorant about what is happening in Brussels” (Interview). 
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For these SNEs, the epistemic role has been much more important than the member-
state role. This observation is also supported by the fact that many SNEs report that 
the content of the work they could do at the Commission was at least as important as a 
motivating factor for being seconded as career considerations, and more important 
than idealism or other motivations (Interviews). 
 
In the interviews, SNEs report that they are very much aware of their dual position, as 
national experts and as independent outsiders. However, many felt that although in 
theory the Commission insists on their independence from their home country, they 
often felt that their colleagues at the Commission viewed them as Dutch and were 
specifically interested in their Dutch perspectives. Many SNEs report that they have 
deliberately brought Dutch problems to the table.  
“SNEs make no secret about their country of origin. You are clearly fulfilling 
a dual role, so you are able to bring problems or positions from your member 
state to the fore. Other fonctionnaires at the Commission also approach you to 
have an ‘early test’ as to whether a specific proposal would be welcomed with 
enthusiasm in the Netherlands or not. As an SNE you can then say: This 
proposal is never going to survive in the Netherlands. So, by the presence of 
SNEs, the policy process proceeds more smoothly and quicker because as an 
SNE you are well informed of the national positions” (Interview with former 
Dutch SNE).  
 
Finally, Table 4 reveals the distribution of loyalties emphasised by current and former 
Commission SNEs. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 demonstrates the multiple loyalties evoked by Commission SNEs. They 
clearly attach greatest loyalty towards the departmental level and secondly towards 
 27 
the supranational level. Intergovernmental loyalties are fairly weak. SNEs have 
multiple institutional affiliations, notably towards their primary institutions (the 
Commission services) and their secondary institutions (their home government). 
Table 4 indicates that SNEs manage to live with multiple loyalties. The strong 
departmental loyalties among SNEs clearly reflect the horizontal specialisation of the 
Commission services as well as the departmentalised recruitment procedure through 
the “submarine procedure”. According to one current Dutch SNE, 
“[a]s an SNE you always have a complicated dual position. But I for one, and 
the people that I know, found a good middle course between on the hand 
loyalty to the Commission and on the other hand loyalty to their home 
country” (Interview).  
 
Another Dutch SNE claims that,  
 
“[a]s an SNE you are loyal to the Commission. But one’s salary is paid by the 
Netherlands. I had no problems functioning in that dual position” (Interview). 
 
Hence, as expected, greatest loyalty is attached towards the immediate organisational 
environments, that is, the unit and DG level. However, a great deal of loyalty is also 
attached towards the corresponding domestic ministry. Secondly, Table 4 shows that 
current SNEs have strikingly lower levels of intergovernmental allegiance than former 
SNEs. These observations demonstrate the impact of organisational affiliations. 
Officials tend to attach strongest loyalty towards their primary organisation. This 
observation is crucial since the home government pays the salaries of SNEs and 
expects them to return after the secondment procedure. Hence, the primary loyalty of 
SNEs is not directed towards their paymaster. 
 
Finally, Table 4 shows that loyalty towards the EU system as a whole is slightly 
stronger among former SNEs than among current SNEs. The opposite is the case with 
respect to loyalty towards the Commission as a whole. In the interviews many current 
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SNEs report that their stay with the Commission undermines their loyalty to their 
home organisations and greatly reinforces their loyalty to the Commission. 
Socialisation of SNEs contributes mainly to create enduring system loyalty towards 
the EU system, and only secondly to install lasting institutional loyalties towards EU 
institutions. Hence, being socialised in the EU system seems to result in enduring 
loyalty towards the EU system as a whole more than towards the Commission. The 
secondment of domestic officials to the Commission in most cases causes them to 
develop a European perspective on policy problems, more or less independently from 
what is the position of their home country. Many report to have become more critical 
towards the actions and positions of their home organisations.  
“When you are here,  you tend to forget the Netherlands, The Hague, where 
you come from. Your background is not important in your daily routine. Your 
first loyalty lies with the Commission” (Interview with current Dutch SNE). 
 
Another current Dutch SNE reports that,  
 
“[a]t the end of the day it is my home organisation who is my employer, but I 
am loyal to the Commission”.  
 
A former Dutch SNE argues that, 
 
“[d]ue to the poor guidance and the lack of contact with the Permanent 
Representation
14
 the situation occurs that after three years, the SNE actually 
feels a stronger loyalty toward the Commission than to the national 
government”.  
 
Finally,  
 
“[y]ou acquire a European mindset, you learn to be sensitive to the interests of 
the other member states. And then you weigh all considerations to each other 
and decide what is best in the general European interest” (Interview with 
former Dutch SNE). 
 
Conclusions 
A long lived assumption in the literature has been that the “secondment system would 
tend to produce an unmanageable cacophony” of officials loyal to the national civil 
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service (Cox 1969: 208). The suspicion early voiced by Coombes (1970) that SNEs 
are highly conscious of their national background is challenged by this study. This 
study demonstrates that the behavioural dynamics applied by SNEs contain a mix of 
departmental, epistemic and supranational behaviour. The intergovernmental dynamic 
is shown to be much less significant. This conclusion supports recent literature that 
reveals that the portfolio logic is essential both at the level of Commissioners and 
among top Commission officials (Egeberg 2006; Hooghe 2005). The primacy of 
departmental and epistemic dynamics among SNEs reflects the departmentalised 
recruitment of these officials, their primary organisational affiliations towards the 
Commission as well as the horizontal specialisation of the Commission services. 
Nordic SNEs, however, evoke stronger member-state roles whereas Dutch SNEs tend 
to enact stronger supranational contact patterns. These differences probably reflect the 
effect of differences in administrative cultures across the seconding member states.  
Although we have been unable to investigate it here (due to insufficient variation 
across the member states under study), we may assume that cross-national variation in 
SNE decision-making behaviour and loyalties is in part accounted for by the state 
structure of the country of origin. SNEs from unitary states are likely to perceive 
larger degrees of misfit in their conceptions of sovereignty between their home 
country and the Commission than for SNEs from federal states. European federal 
polities are characterised by sophisticated and complex institutional mechanisms that 
help to accommodate territorial lines of conflict. For this reason, bureaucrats from 
federal polities are less likely to consider territorial conflicts as zero-sum games and 
more used to share sovereignty across territorial levels (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 
151).  
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Moreover, considerable variation is observed between current and former SNEs in 
terms of their supranational loyalties towards the Commission. Nonetheless, former 
SNEs’ overall system loyalties towards the EU as a whole appear rather sticky and 
enduring. This is a crucial testimony of the socialising powers of the Commission 
while in office. The secondment system seems to strengthen and consolidate 
supranational loyalties across levels of government in Europe, supporting the 
expansion and intensification of the multilevel administrative system between the 
Commission and domestic administration. However, this study also shows that the 
actual contact patterns applied by SNEs support this multilevel administration only to 
a limited extent due to the remarkably low degree of national contacts during their 
secondment period. This underscores the behavioural autonomy of SNEs vis-à-vis the 
member-states while working at the Commission. 
 
Past research suggests that supranational loyalties are contingent “on whether one is 
paid by ones country of origin or by the organization…” (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004: 
20). SNEs are paid by their member-state while seconded to the Commission, and still 
they adopt supranational loyalties. Moreover, upon return to their member-state, SNEs 
retain a fairly strong supranational loyalty towards the EU system as a whole and less 
towards the Commission particularly. This observation clearly reflects conditional 
processes of socialisation of SNEs within the Commission more than rationalist 
mechanisms of expected utility and anticipated returns. Upon return in the member-
states, however, former SNEs shift loyalties towards the national level and their 
primary institutional affiliations. The long-lasting effect of socialisation within the 
Commission is largely lacking.  
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Tables 
Table 1 Four ideal-typical decision-making dynamics 
The 
intergovernmental 
SNE 
 
The supranational 
SNE 
 
The departmental 
SNE 
 
The epistemic SNE 
- Loyalty to the 
nation-state and 
the home 
government 
- Mandated by 
domestic 
government 
institutions 
- Guided by 
domestic 
preferences and 
concerns 
- Diplomatic code 
of conduct 
- Loyalty to the 
EU as a whole 
- Mandated by 
the Commission 
leadership 
- Preferences for 
“the common 
good” 
- Community 
codes of conduct 
- Loyalty 
towards own 
portfolio 
- Mandated by 
department and 
unit rules 
- Guided by 
departmental 
preferences and 
concerns 
- Departmental 
codes of conduct 
- Discipline 
loyalty 
- Professional 
discretion and 
room of 
manoeuvre  
- Guided by 
professional 
preferences and 
considerations  
- Contacts with 
professional 
experts 
- Professional 
codes of conduct 
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Table 2 “How frequently do you have work-related contacts and/or meetings 
with the following during a typical week in your current function”? (Percent) 
 
Four ideal-typical contact patterns: 
Data 
1 
Data 
2 
Data 
3  
1) Intergovernmental contacts: 
- with ministries in country of origin working within other 
policy areas than current portfolio 
- with ministries of other members-states working within 
other policy areas than current portfolio 
- with the EU Permanent Representation of country of origin 
- with the EU Permanent Representation of other member-
states 
 
 
5 
 
4 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
5 
 
2 
18 
 
7 
 
 
40 
 
3 
20 
 
2 
2) Supranational contacts: 
- with the other EU institutions than the Commission 
- with other international organisations 
 
8 
18 
 
30 
25 
 
10 
10 
3) Departmental contacts: 
- with colleagues in other DGs (current SNEs) / in the 
Commission (former SNEs) 
- with ministries in country of origin working within current 
portfolio 
- with ministries in other member-states working within 
current portfolio 
 
 
27 
 
6 
 
29 
 
 
67 
 
51 
 
28 
 
 
22 
 
73 
 
17 
4) Epistemic contacts: 
- with business representatives in country of origin** 
- with business representatives in other member-states 
- with NGO representatives in country of origin 
- with NGO representatives in other member-states 
- with universities or research institutes in country of 
origin*** 
- with universities or research institutes in other member-
states 
 
19 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
25 
 
-- 
 
13 
16 
7 
7 
 
9 
 
11 
 
32 
12 
8 
0 
 
12 
 
5 
Mean N 100 
(67) 
100 
(44) 
100 
(40) 
* The percentages listed are the sum of the percentage of officials who have daily or weekly contacts 
with the respective actors. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: daily (value 5), 
weekly (value 4), monthly (value 3), yearly (value 2), and less than one per year (value 1).  
** The questionnaire in ’Data 1’ did not separate between EU-level business and industry and national 
business and industry. 
*** The questionnaire in ’Data 1’ did not separate between universities or research institutes of 
country of origin vs. from other member-states. 
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Table 3 “To what extent do you think that SNEs act as ‘independent experts’ or 
as ‘member-state representatives’”? (percent)* 
 ◄------►  
 Independent expert         Both/and member-state representative N 
Data 1 74 20 6 100 (67) 
Data 2 94 4 2 100 (46) 
Data 3 86 7 7 100 (43) 
* Original Scale: Value  1 = Independent expert – Value  7=Member-State representative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 40 
Table 4 “To whom do you feel loyal to in your current function?” (percent)* 
 
Four ideal-typical allegiance patterns: 
Data 
1 
Data 
2 
Data 
3 
1) Intergovernmental loyalty towards: 
- the state/administration in their country of origin 
- the national government in their country of origin 
- the national governments of other member-states  
- the ministries of other member-states  
 
9 
5 
9 
11 
 
33 
13 
4 
9 
 
72 
45 
5 
7 
2) Supranational loyalty towards: 
- the Commission as a whole 
- the EU system as a whole 
- other international organisations 
 
69 
63 
12 
 
70 
63 
33 
 
42 
70 
24 
3) Departmental loyalty towards: 
- the Unit they are working in 
- the DG they are (current SNEs) /were (former SNEs) 
working in 
- the Ministry they were (current SNEs) /are (former SNEs) 
working in 
 
84 
84 
 
-- 
 
98 
96 
 
73 
 
90 
48 
 
77 
4) Epistemic loyalty towards: 
- their own professional community / area of expertise  
- the requirements of their own policy sector 
- business and industry 
- trade unions 
- universities and research institutes 
 
77 
70 
8 
2 
8 
 
71 
74 
37 
9 
28 
 
81 
64 
38 
7 
24 
Mean N 100 
(66) 
100 
(46) 
100 
(41) 
* The percentages listed are a sum of officials who have very strong or fairy strong loyalty to the 
entities. This dichotomy stems from the following five-point scale: very strong (value 5), fairly strong 
(value 4), average (value 3), fairly weak (value 2), and very weak (value 1). 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 This publication has been possible thanks of the support of CONNEX, the Network of Excellence on 
efficient and democratic governance in the European Union, funded under the EU 6
th
 Framework 
Programme of Research. 
2 The Commission formalised in 2004 new rules on the secondment of national experts to the 
Commission (Commission Decision C(2004) 577 of 27 February 2004). 
3
 However, the current Commission is argued to have become more “presidential”, “with Mr. Barroso 
personally steering Brussels’ most important policy dossiers such as energy and the EU constitution” 
(EUobserver 2007). 
4 CLENAD is the staff organisation for SNEs in the Commission. 
5 The DGs covered by this first survey are: DG Education and Culture, DG Employment and Social 
Affairs, DG Enterprise, DG Environment, DG Energy and Transport, Eurostat, DG Fisheries, DG 
Health and Consumer Affairs, DG Information Society, DG Research, DG Taxation and Customs 
Union, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, DG Trade, DG Competition, and DG Development.  
6 EU member-states covered in this first survey are: Sweden (N=44), Denmark (N=3). EEA countries 
covered: Norway (N=20) and Iceland (N=2). Three respondents did not report their country of origin.  
7 One of the respondents had been seconded before this period, but given the value of gathered data the 
respondent has been included in the analyses. 
8 The survey was sent by e-mail, but the respondents were given a choice of returning the completed 
document per e-mail or per post. 
10 Caroline de Gruyter, 17-18 January 2004, NRC Handelsblad, “Banenjagen voor het Vaderland”, p. 
39. 
11 Interview with SNE25, Brussels, January 2006.  
12 Interview with SNE84, The Hague, March 2006 
13 Some times SNEs are recruited from national agencies without the knowledge of the ministry 
(Statskontoret 2001:17: 27). 
14
 The interviews with the current Dutch SNEs indicate that this situation has changed though. Since 
the appointment of a coordinator for the careers of Dutch officials at the Dutch Permanent 
Representation in Brussels, the Permanent Representation has been increasingly active in organising 
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receptions, conferences, and the like to gather Dutch officials working in Brussels which all current 
SNEs interviews have reported to participate in. 
